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Abstract
Consumers seeking to purchase caskets online could benefit from the Supreme Court’s 2005 
decision that states cannot discriminate against interstate direct wine shipment. Federal courts 
have reached conflicting conclusions when asked whether state laws requiring casket sellers to 
be licensed funeral directors violate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. In Powers v. 
Harris, the 10th Circuit even offered an unprecedented ruling that economic protectionism is a 
legitimate state interest that can justify otherwise unconstitutional policies. In Granholm v. 
Heald, however, the Supreme Court declared that discriminatory barriers to interstate wine 
shipment must be justified by a legitimate state interest, and states must present real evidence 
that the discrimination is necessary to accomplish their policy objectives. The Court conducted a 
fact-intensive analysis which concluded the states had failed to make a persuasive case in favor 
of discrimination against out-of-state wine sellers. Examining the economic evidence, we find 
that state laws which impede electronic commerce in caskets would almost certainly fail a 
Granholm- style factual analysis. This implies that such laws could be held unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause, if a plaintiff brought a challenge similar to the one in Granholm.  
Our analysis also suggests that the laws are vulnerable to an Equal Protection or Due Process 
challenge if courts consider whether evidence actually supports the state’s defense.
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2Introduction
The Internet now affects the market for virtually every good and service imaginable, from cars 
and contact lenses to teaching and telemedicine. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Internet is also 
affecting the funeral market. Independent vendors often sell caskets online at much lower prices 
than funeral homes, which typically mark up their caskets by 300-400%. Many online vendors 
also offer a greater variety, such as individualized caskets with western or Victorian themes. One 
online vendor features caskets emblazoned with the phrase “Return to Sender.”
Some states, however, have adopted regulations that could limit online casket sales. In 
approximately ten states, state law permits retail casket sales only through a vendor who has a 
funeral director’s license or operates a physical funeral establishment. These requirements can 
impose high costs in both time and money. In South Carolina, for example, a licensee must 
complete an apprenticeship that lasts “a minimum of twenty-four months.” Proponents argue that 
such regulations protect consumers by preventing high-pressure sales tactics and ensuring proper 
burials, while critics counter that such regulations merely protect funeral homes from 
competition.
Partly because of their high costs and ambiguous benefits, these types of funeral regulations have 
come under legal attack. In three recent cases, federal courts struck regulations pursuant to the 
rational basis test after finding that they did not advance any legitimate state interests. A fourth 
court upheld similar regulations, despite finding no evidence that the regulations benefited casket 
buyers. In a remarkable opinion, the court concluded that economic protectionism for licensed 
funeral directors, by itself, qualified as a legitimate state interest.
A recent Supreme Court decision may further alter the analysis of state regulations that impede 
e-commerce in favor of local merchants. In Granholm v. Heald, the Court struck down 
discriminatory bans against interstate direct shipping of wine, including state laws that required 
an out-of-state supplier to maintain an in-state “physical presence” to do business on equal terms 
with in-state suppliers. In so holding, the Court recognized that pre-existing state regulations can 
impede the flow of e-commerce, and used empirical evidence to evaluate the regulations’ effect 
on consumers and state interests. The Court conducted a fact-intensive analysis which concluded 
the states had failed to make a persuasive case in favor of discrimination against out-of-state 
wine sellers. Although Granholm involved the negative Commerce Clause rather than the Equal 
Protection or Due Process Clause, the Court’s rationale ultimately may affect the analysis of 
regulations in the funeral industry and other markets affected by e-commerce, including 
automobiles, real estate, teaching, and medicine.
Examining the economic evidence, we find that state funeral regulations which impede 
electronic commerce in caskets would almost certainly fail a Granholm-style factual analysis. 
This implies that such regulations could be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, if 
a plaintiff mounts a challenge similar to the one in Granholm. Our analysis also suggests that the 
laws are vulnerable to an Equal Protection or Due Process challenge if courts consider whether 
evidence actually supports the state’s defense.
3Part I of this Article summarizes the recent cases involving state regulation of casket sales. 
Part II explains how Granholm could alter the analysis of these regulations, as well as state 
regulations involving e-commerce generally. Part III examines state casket regulations through 
the prism of a Granholm analysis, including a discussion of the casket market, the benefit of e-
commerce for consumers, and the data regarding consumer welfare and consumer protection. 
Part IV concludes.
I. Recent Funeral Cases
In four recent cases, courts addressed the constitutionality of state casket regulations.2 In each 
case, state statutes and regulations limited casket sales to licensed funeral directors, but also 
erected significant obstacles to obtaining a license. Typically, the state required a casket vendor 
to obtain a “funeral director” and a “funeral establishment” license as a prerequisite to selling 
caskets. The plaintiffs—casket vendors and consumers—challenged the statutes on various 
constitutional grounds, such as the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. They argued that the licensing requirements were not rationally related to any 
legitimate state interest, because the requirements had no rational relation to the business of 
selling caskets. The states countered that their laws advanced legitimate consumer protection 
goals, such as protecting grieving consumers from overreaching sales tactics and ensuring the 
safe disposal of human remains.
All four courts analyzed the regulations under the rational basis test. In three of the cases, out of 
Tennessee, Mississippi, and Georgia, the courts struck the statutes. These courts concluded that 
the licensing requirements advanced no legitimate state interest, and that in any event, the states 
had less restrictive means of achieving their goals. In the fourth case, out of Oklahoma, the court 
held that economic protectionism alone qualified as a legitimate state interest for constitutional 
purposes.
A.  Cases Striking Licensing Requirements
The leading case, Craigmiles v. Giles, involved the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers 
Act. The Act forbade anyone from selling caskets unless they obtained a state “funeral director” 
license. To obtain a license, an applicant had to complete either (1) one year of study at the only 
mortuary school accredited in Tennessee, plus a one-year apprenticeship with an existing funeral 
director, or (2) a two-year apprenticeship. After the two years, the applicant then had to pass a 
funeral arts test. Most of the applicant’s training, however, had little to do with selling caskets. 
Expert witnesses testified that no more than 5% of the mortuary school’s curriculum involved 
caskets and urns, and less than 15% of the questions on the funeral test dealt with caskets and 
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4urns. Much of the remaining coursework dealt with extraneous issues such as embalming or 
“restorative art.”3
Nathaniel Craigmiles operated two independent casket stores that sold caskets, urns, flower 
holders, and other funeral merchandise. His stores did not embalm bodies or arrange funeral 
services. Based on the Tennessee Act, however, the Tennessee Funeral Board issued a cease and 
desist order to bar Craigmiles from selling caskets or other merchandise. Represented by the 
libertarian public interest group the Institute for Justice, Craigmiles and other plaintiffs sued on 
the ground that the statute, as applied to him, violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the 14th Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the case using the rational basis test. Under that test, a regulation is 
constitutional if it bears some rational relation to a legitimate state interest. As the court 
explained, a statute enjoys a strong presumption of validity, and is valid “if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” To justify such a 
statute, the state need not provide “an exquisite evidentiary record” but only “rational speculation 
linking the regulation to a legitimate purpose, even unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” 
The court stated, however, that “Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete 
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”4
Turning to Tennessee’s Act, the court found that the law was “nothing more than an attempt to 
prevent economic competition.” In the first place, the court found that the statute did not promote 
public health and safety. The plaintiffs did not embalm or otherwise handle the bodies. The court 
stated that, in theory, low quality caskets could potentially threaten public health if they leaked, 
but the court noted that the Act imposed no safety standards on caskets; the Act did not require 
that consumers use any particular type of casket or, indeed, any casket at all. Moreover, the Act 
had the practical result of increasing casket prices, which likely led consumers to buy relatively 
less protective caskets. For similar reasons, the court also discounted the state’s consumer 
protection rationale. Addressing concerns about fraud, the court held that the Act’s licensing 
requirement was overbroad because general consumer protection laws already applied to 
retailers, and the state could always apply more stringent laws to retailers without requiring 
licensing. In any event, consumers would still have to consult a licensed funeral director for 
arranging services and handling the body.5
After disposing of the Act’s proffered rationales, the court concluded that Tennessee’s actions 
were simply “naked attempts to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral 
directors extract from consumers.” The court found that “[t]he licensure requirement imposes a 
significant barrier to competition in the casket market” by “protecting licensed funeral directors 
from competition on caskets.” As the court explained, “dedicating two years and thousands of 
dollars to the education and training required for licensure is undoubtedly a significant barrier to 
3
 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 322.
4 Id. at 224-25.  
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5entering the Tennessee casket markets.” These entry barriers led to higher prices for consumers. 
As the court found, “funeral home operators generally mark up the price of caskets 250 to 600%, 
whereas casket retailers sell caskets at much smaller margins.”6
Courts used similar reasoning to invalidate funeral regulations in Georgia and Mississippi. In 
Peachtree Caskets Direct, Inc. v. State Board of Funeral Service of Georgia, a district court 
enjoined enforcement of Georgia’s licensing scheme because “neither the statute nor any rules of 
the [Board] contain standards for the design, construction, or sale of caskets or alternative 
containers.”7 Similarly, in Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, the district court acknowledged that 
the state had a legitimate interest in the prompt disposition of human remains and consumer 
protection, but held that the state’s licensing scheme bore no rational relationship to those 
purposes. For example, Mississippi “failed to show that the licensing requirement in any way 
speeds the process of burial . . . [or] to provide any evidence that unlicensed dealers slow burial 
or cremation.”8 In addition, although Mississippi had expressed concern about vendors soliciting 
dead bodies, its license requirement did not prevent licensees from soliciting casket sales. As a 
result, the court concluded that Mississippi’s law protected funeral homes at the expense of 
consumers: “As a result of this [licensing] requirement, consumers in Mississippi are offered 
fewer choices when it comes to selecting a casket. Consequently, there is less price competition 
among the sellers of caskets. Ultimately, the consumer is harmed by this regulation as one is 
forced to pay higher prices in a far less competitive environment.”9
In addition to these court cases, an opinion from the Texas Attorney General similarly concluded 
that, under Texas law, the state should allow vendors to sell caskets without a license. As the 
Attorney General explained, “while a casket indeed constitutes funeral merchandise, the simple 
sale of a casket, without more, is not an act of funeral directing and accordingly does not violate” 
Texas law.10 The opinion noted that the “sale does not directly involve the disposition of a body,” 
and that “what distinguishes a funeral director is ‘the duty . . . to take charge of,’ and prepare for 
burial or other disposition, a dead human body.”11
B.  Cases Upholding Licensing Requirements
In contrast to these decisions, the Tenth Circuit recently held that licensing requirements do, in 
fact, further a legitimate state interest—economic protectionism. In Powers v. Harris,12 the court 
considered Oklahoma’s Funeral Services Licensing Act, which required that anyone engaged in 
the sale of funeral merchandise, including caskets, have a funeral director’s license and operate 
6 Id.
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8 124 F.Supp.2d. 434, 438 (S.D. Miss. 2000).   
9 Id. at 440.  See also Office of Mississippi AG, Opinion No. 2003-0588, 2003 WL 22970542 (applying Casket 
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6out of a licensed funeral establishment. To obtain a license, a candidate must, among other 
things, graduate from an accredited program of mortuary science, complete sixty college 
semester hours at an accredited institution of higher education, pass two exams, and complete a 
one-year apprenticeship in a funeral home, “during which the applicant must embalm 25 bodies.”  
Under the Act, a “funeral establishment” must have a fixed physical location, preparation room 
for embalming bodies, merchandise-selection room with at least five caskets, and adequate space 
for public viewing of human remains.13 The Act extends to intrastate sales only. Out-of-state 
vendors can sell caskets directly to Oklahoma consumers, and Oklahoma vendors can sell 
caskets to out-of-state consumers.
The plaintiff, an online casket vender based in Oklahoma, charged that the Act bore no rational 
relation to Oklahoma’s proffered rationale of protecting consumers. Like the plaintiffs in 
Craigmiles, the plaintiffs pointed out that less than 5% of the education and training 
requirements related directly to selling caskets. Oklahoma, like Tennessee, countered that the 
regulations were not “wholly irrelevant” to the state’s interests because some funeral consumers 
may be vulnerable to overreaching sales tactics. Oklahoma also argued that the state deserved 
“leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.”14
Unlike Craigmiles, however, the Powers court ignored the question of whether the state’s 
statutes actually served the interests of consumers. Instead, the court stated that it was “obliged 
to consider every plausible legitimate state interest that might support the [Act]—not just the 
consumer-protection interest forwarded by the parties.”15 Accordingly, the court proceeded 
directly to consider “whether protecting the intrastate funeral industry, absent a violation of a 
specific constitutional provision or a valid federal statute, constitutes a legitimate state interest.”16
In a decision that embodies the worst fears of Mancur Olson’s The Rise and Decline of Nations, 
the court held that the naked protectionism qualifies as a legitimate state interest. “[T]he 
Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or favoring one particular intrastate industry, 
absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory violation, is a legitimate state interest.”17 As 
the court explained, “dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains 
the favored pastime of state and local governments.”18  Therefore, “in practical terms, we would 
paralyze state governments if we undertook a probing review of each of their actions.”19 To strike 
Oklahoma’s protectionist scheme for funeral homes would have the effect of threatening 
licensing schemes for all professionals, including doctors, electricians, or plumbers.20  Faced with 
the prospect of unlicensed accountants or even lawyers, the court upheld the Act’s 
13 Id. at 1213.  
14 Id. at 1216 (citation omitted). 
15 Id. at 1217.  
16 Id. at 1218.  
17 Id. at 1220.  
18 Id. at 1221.  
19 Id. at 1218.  
20 Id. at 1222.  
7constitutionality because “[t]here can be no serious dispute that the [Act] is ‘very well tailored’ 
to protecting the intrastate funeral-home industry.”21
The court criticized Craigmiles for relying on cases involving interstate, not intrastate, 
commerce. “Our country’s constitutionally enshrined policy favoring a national marketplace is 
simply irrelevant as to whether a state may legitimately protect one intrastate industry as against 
another when the challenge to the statute is purely one of equal protection.”22 The court also 
criticized Craigmiles for examining the motives of the state’s legislature, rather than considering 
every conceivable rationale for the state’s actions.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tymkovich criticized the majority for adopting an “unconstrained 
view of economic protectionism as a ‘legitimate state interest.’”23 According to him, the majority 
had created “an almost per se rule upholding intrastate protectionist legislation.” In Judge 
Tymkovich’s view, in contrast, courts should uphold a protectionist effect only where “the 
discriminatory legislation arguably advances either the general welfare or a public interest.”24
Although conceding that “[c]onsumer interests appear to be harmed rather than protected by the 
limitation of choice and price encouraged by the licensing restrictions on intrastate casket 
sales,”25 Judge Tymkovich nevertheless found that Oklahoma had demonstrated its legitimate 
interest in promoting the general welfare by bringing enforcement actions under the Act against 
funeral directors.
Aside from Powers, one other recent decision held that states have a legitimate, non -protectionist 
rationale in requiring a license to sell a casket. In South Carolina, a state administrative law 
judge enjoined a stand-alone casket store from selling caskets because the store did not have a 
license as a “funeral establishment.”26 The administrative court held that the state had a 
“legitimate interest” in requiring licenses for casket vendors because a casket “directly impacts 
sanitation.”27 Finally, in 1998, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals upheld the state’s casket 
sales restriction based on health and sanitation concerns.28
21 Id. at 1223.
22 Id. at 1220.  
23 Id. at 1225.  
24 Id. at 1225.  
25 Id. at 1227.
26 South Carolina Dep’t of Labor v. Workman, No. 98-ALJ-11-0634-IJ, 1999 WL 459728, *5 (S.C. Admin Law Div. 
May 20, 1999). South Carolina permits third parties to sell caskets “at-need” but not “pre-need.” The state requires 
third party sellers to hold a license to sell retail caskets, which is not the same as a funeral director’s license but 
involves some costly requirements. See S.C. Code Ann. 19 §§ 40-19-265 (discussing permit requirements for 
funeral homes); 32-7-10 et seq (discussing preneed funeral contracts).
27 Workman, 1999 WL 459728, at *8.
28 Stone Casket, 976 P.2d 1074.
8II. Judicial Tests Assessing Regulatory Barriers
Based on the great weight of authority, states lack a rational basis in applying funeral director 
and funeral establishment licensing schemes to online casket sales. Other than Powers, the case 
law provides no support for the idea that intrastate protectionism, by itself, qualifies as a 
legitimate state interest. Moreover, a recent Supreme Court decision may lead courts to more 
closely scrutinize state licensing schemes that impair the flow of e-commerce, particularly where 
empirical evidence shows that the licensing scheme harms, rather than helps, consumer welfare.
A. Protectionism and Rational Bases
In all four of the recent casket cases, plaintiffs primarily argued that the statutes violated the 
Equal Protection, Due Process, or Privileges or Immunities Clauses. The plaintiffs did not 
(seriously) allege that the statutes discriminated against out-of-state competitors in violation of 
the Commerce Clause, or that the statutes discriminated against, for example, a discrete and 
insular minority. In Powers, the plaintiffs had argued that Oklahoma’s statutes violated the 
Commerce Clause before the district court; the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate this claim because Oklahoma had never enforced its statutes against out-of-state 
vendors, and the plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling. Accordingly, all four cases analyzed the 
state statutes using the deferential rational basis test. Under that test, a regulation is constitutional 
“if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.”29 Courts 
do not require states to provide an “exquisite evidentiary record” to justify their legislative 
purposes, so long as the purposes are legitimate.
Aside from Powers, no court decision—and certainly no Supreme Court decision—has ever held 
that protectionism, by itself, qualifies as a legitimate state interest.30 For example, the Powers
majority cites Williamson v. Lee Optical31 for the proposition that a state may legitimately try to 
free a profession “from all taints of commercialism.” The majority also cites two tax cases in 
which states taxed different types of property at different rates, and one case in which New 
Orleans created a grandfather exception for longtime vendors of pushcart foodstuffs. Although 
all of these cited decisions allowed governments to discriminate in favor of certain economic 
interests, none of them supports the majority’s sweeping proclamation.
As the Powers concurrence explained, in all of those cases “the discriminatory legislation 
arguably advances either the general welfare or a public interest.”32 In Williamson, for example, 
the Supreme Court invoked consumer safety and health interests to uphold the state’s regulation 
of eye care. Likewise, in the other cases, the Court invariably upheld the legislation, at least in 
part, because the legislation promoted the public good. In both the pushcart and tax cases, the 
Court stressed the need to preserve legitimate reliance interests or promote general economic 
29
 Craigmiles at 224.  
30
 See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1220-21; id. at 1225 (Tymkovich, concurring).  
31 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
32 Id. at 225.
9prosperity.33 As these decisions illustrate, the Constitution may let the government play favorites, 
but only if the government does so, at least in part, for the good of the game.34
B. Granholm
Indeed, a 2005 Supreme Court decision, Granholm v. Heald, may lead courts to more closely 
scrutinize state regulation that impairs the flow of e-commerce in order to benefit local economic 
interests. In Granholm, the Court considered statutory schemes in New York and Michigan that 
allowed in-state vendors, but not out-of-state vendors, to ship wine directly to consumers. As the 
Court recognized, “[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single largest 
regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine.”35 The Court also recognized that the bans 
had the effect of protecting intrastate wineries and wholesalers from competition. Because the 
plaintiffs alleged that the statutes discriminated against interstate commerce, the Court analyzed 
the statutes under the rubric of the negative, or “dormant,” Commerce Clause. The Court 
ultimately held that the statutes violated the Commerce Clause by giving in-state vendors an 
advantage over out-of-state competitors, and that the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed 
Prohibition, did not authorize the discriminatory treatment.
In analyzing the statutes under the Commerce Clause, the Court applied a different framework 
than that used to analyze purely intrastate statutes under the Equal Protection or Due Process 
Clauses. Instead of deferring to the state legislature and requiring only “rational speculation” to 
uphold the legislation, the Court demanded evidence. “Our Commerce Clause cases demand 
more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods. The burden is 
on the State to show that the discrimination is demonstrably justified.”36 The Court holds 
discriminatory statutes to a higher standard for several reasons. For example, from a public 
choice standpoint, more rigorous scrutiny makes sense because out-of-state residents may lack 
the ability to defend their interests in another state’s legislature.37
33 In Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 123 S.Ct. 2156, 156 L.Ed.2d 97 (2003) invoked 
economic development and protecting the reliance interests of river-boat owners, in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) invoked historical preservation and economic prosperity, and in 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) invoked neighborhood preservation, 
continuity, stability, and protecting the reliance interests of property owners.
34
  See generally Powers v. Harris: How the Tenth Circuit Buried Economic Liberties, 82 Denver U. L. Rev. 585 
(2005).
35 Id. at *5 (quoting an FTC report).  
36 Id. at *21 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
37 The public choice point has been discussed most thoroughly in debate over the “state action” immunity from 
federal antitrust laws, where scholars have noted that extensive state action immunity could allow a state to impose 
costs on citizens of other states who are not represented in its legislature. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and 
the Economics of Federalism,  26 J. L. & Econ. 23 (1983); Robert P. Inman and Daniel J. Rubinfeld, Making Sense 
of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory 
Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return 
to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 227 (1987); Federal Trade Commission State Action Task 
Force, Report of the State Action Task Force, 35-40 (2003) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
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More importantly for the judiciary, a central purpose of the Constitution is to protect the free 
flow of goods among the states. “If there was any one object riding over every other in the 
adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free 
from all invidious and partial restraints.”38 The Founders believed that “to succeed, the new 
Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”39
The Commerce Clause enshrines the Founders’ purpose by prohibiting protectionist state 
regulation. Although the Clause’s text grants affirmative power to Congress, “It has long been 
accepted that the Commerce Clause . . . directly limits the power of the States to discriminate 
against interstate commerce. This ‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic 
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.”40 In stressing this aspect of the Commerce Clause, James 
Madison wrote that it “grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the 
non-importing, and was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among 
the States themselves.”41
Although Granholm analyzed the wine statutes using a different, more rigorous test than that 
used to analyze the casket statutes, Granholm’s analysis ultimately may affect the way in which 
courts analyze any licensing scheme that impairs the flow of e-commerce.
First, and perhaps most importantly, Granholm recognized that e-commerce benefits consumers 
and that pre-existing state regulatory schemes can prevent new entrants from competing via the 
Internet. The Court noted, for example, that “[wholesaler consolidation] has led many small 
wineries to rely on direct shipping to reach new markets. Technological improvements, in 
particular the ability of wineries to sell wine over the Internet, have helped make direct 
shipments an attractive sales channel.”42 The Court also recognized that a state ban on direct 
shipping “substantially limits the direct sale of wine to consumers, an otherwise emerging and 
significant business,” even though the “wine producers in the cases before us are small wineries 
that rely on direct consumer sales as an important part of their businesses.”43 Indeed, without 
direct shipping, many smaller wineries would find distribution “economically infeasible.”44
38 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (Johnson, J.). See also Agarwal and Zywicki, NYU J L & Liberty.
39 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
40 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988). Accord Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 
(1984) (“One of the fundamental purposes of the Clause ‘was to insure . . . against discriminating State 
legislation.’”) (quoting Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1876)); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 
522 (1935). 
41
 3 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. III, p. 478 (1911) (cited in West Lynn Creamery, 
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994)).
42
 Granholm at *5.  
43 Id.
44 Id. *at 6, 9.
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Having acknowledged the importance of e-commerce to both consumers and some producers, 
the Court may become more willing to force states to articulate plausible reasons for restricting 
e-commerce, even for regulations that ostensibly apply only to intrastate transactions. In 
particular, Granholm may serve as a template for the types of empirical evidence that courts will 
consider, and perhaps require, in the course of evaluating licensing schemes that affect e-
commerce under the rational basis test.45  For example, New York and Michigan had argued that 
interstate direct shipping allowed minors to buy wine online, and had provided some anecdotal 
evidence in support. In finding these assertions “unsupported,” the Court relied heavily on a 
study of the wine industry by the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC’s Wine Report canvassed 
over a dozen states that permitted interstate direct shipping and found that none of them had 
reported any problems with direct sales of wine to minors.46 The Wine Report also relied on 
other surveys and basic economic principles to conclude that minors were more interested in beer 
and spirits, rather than wine, and that minors had far more direct means of obtaining alcohol than 
the Internet. In effect, the Wine Report undermined all of the states’ speculative, non-
protectionist arguments against direct shipping. The Court’s complete embrace of the Wine 
Report and scepticism of the states’ arguments suggests that, in the future, the Court may be 
amenable to using such evidence to evaluate state laws under the more lenient rational basis test.
Moreover, Granholm also may increase the burden on states to justify treating in-state and out-
of-state vendors differently. The Court found that, even if direct shipping increased underage 
drinking, the states could not justify banning interstate direct shipping while allowing intrastate 
direct shipping. As the Court noted, “minors are just as likely to order wine from in-state 
producers as from out-of-state ones.”47 Arguably, this rationale also could apply on sales of 
online caskets. In Powers, Oklahoma banned intrastate unlicensed vendors from selling caskets 
directly to Oklahoma consumers, but never tried to prohibit out-of-state unlicensed vendors from 
selling caskets directly to Oklahoma consumers. The record contained no evidence of any 
problems with any sales from out-of-state vendors. Based on Granholm, a court could well find 
that the lack of a problem from out-of-state vendors thoroughly undermines the plausibility of a 
state’s need to limit intrastate sales, even under the rational basis test. In the Internet world, all 
commerce is, in a sense, interstate commerce.
In fact, courts could well decide that all e-commerce is “interstate commerce” for constitutional 
purposes. In the first place, some of the physical peculiarities of Internet casket sales often 
necessitate interstate commerce. Some Internet casket sellers develop networks of bricks-and-
mortar funeral homes that handle deliveries. In any given transaction, the funeral home handling 
the delivery often may ship the casket to a local market far from its physical location—in many 
cases, far enough to cross state lines. One of Funeral Depot’s funeral home partners, for 
example, will deliver only outside of its local market.48 In addition, the states typically do not 
45 See Granholm at *20.  
46 See id.; Wine Report.  
47 Id. at *20.  
48
 David E. Harrington, Brick-and-Mortar Barriers to Internet Casket Sales: Are State Funeral Regulations Part of 
the Mortar?, Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association (November 19, 2005) (manuscript on file with 
authors).
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limit their statutes and regulations solely to intrastate sales. In Powers, the district court held that 
it lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the Commerce Clause claim because Oklahoma had not 
enforced its regulatory scheme against out-of-state vendors. In another case, however, perhaps a 
declaratory judgment suit, a court could find that the risk of such enforcement could “chill” 
interstate sales enough to raise a Commerce Clause issue.
Finally, Granholm may force states to consider less restrictive regulatory alternatives if the states 
attempt to limit e-commerce with onerous licensing schemes.49 “[I]mprovements in technology 
have eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries. Background checks can be done 
electronically. Financial records and sales data can be mailed, faxed, or submitted via e-mail.”50
As the court explained in Craigmiles, the existence of less restrictive, pro-competitive 
alternatives increases the burden on the state to justify more onerous rules.51 This analysis 
ultimately could affect state regulation of a number of industries, such as automobiles (where 
most states prohibit manufacturers from selling new cars directly to consumers and instead 
require them to sell through a licensed car dealer), real estate (where many states require dealers 
to obtain a license), teaching, or telemedicine.52
III.  Casket Markets and Regulation
A Granholm-type analysis thoroughly undercuts the rationale for requiring casket vendors to 
obtain a funeral director’s license or open a physical funeral establishment. The empirical 
evidence shows that, as applied to online casket sales, such regulations merely raise prices and 
limit competition. 
A. The Overall Casket Market
The funeral industry represents a prime target for further e-commerce litigation. Consumers 
spend approximately $11 billion on cremations, funerals, and funeral-related expenses annually, 
to take care of the roughly 2.4 million Americans who die every year. They thus pay roughly 
$4522 per death, making funerals one of the largest-ticket consumer purchases.53 There are 
three major casket manufacturers: Batesville Casket, York Group, and Aurora Casket. Batesville 
Casket had $510 million in sales in 2002, while both York Group and Aurora Casket have annual 
sales of approximately $130 million.54 The leading manufacturers sell their caskets to funeral 
homes, who in turn sell most of the caskets to consumers. Three large funeral home chains, 
49 See id. at *21.  
50 Id.
51 Craigmiles at ___.
52
 See FTC workshop.
53
 Judith Chevalier and Fiona Scott Morton, National Bureau of Economic Research, State Casket Sales 
Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking? 1 (2006)..
54
 Hoover’s Company Profiles, Hillenbrand Indus., Inc. (Dec. 3, 2003); Matthews Int’l Names Jonathan H. Maurer 
President of York Casket, PR Newswire, Apr. 9, 2002.
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Service Corp. International (SCI), the Alderwoods Group, and Stewart Enterprises, collectively 
own about one-fifth of the nation’s 23,000 funeral homes and handle about one-fifth of the 
funerals.55
The large funeral home chains have not developed a substantial online presence, and nearly 70% 
of funeral homes nationwide have yet to establish a Web site.56 Of those sites that do exist, “the 
vast majority of funeral home Web sites are little more than marketing tools.”57 Unlike in some 
other industries, the leading manufacturers do not sell and are not seeking to sell their products 
directly to consumers via the Internet, although at least one smaller manufacturer, Casket Royale, 
Inc. does ship caskets directly to consumers, as well as to retailers.58 Rather, most online casket 
sales come from independent casket vendors or individual funeral homes that have an online 
presence.59
Online sales are a small,60 but seemingly growing part of the casket market. Although there are 
no hard data,61 as of 2001, online casket sales represented only about 1% of all casket sales.62 In a 
2004 survey of funeral homes, however, 56% of respondents identified Internet sellers as a 
significant source of competition for casket sales.63 In California, independent vendors estimate 
that they now may have about 3% of the casket market in some cities,64 and a funeral industry 
web developer reports that 10% of its clients sold funeral services online in 2003, up from 3% in 
2001.65 Similarly, “funeral industry executives and analysts say that consumers are increasingly 
interested in being able to shop online for their funeral needs.”66
55
 National Casket Retailers Assoc., News & Funeral Statistics (2003), at http://www.casketstores.com/News.htm.
56 Web Sites: 6 Tips to Launch or Upgrade Your Online Calling Card, Funeral Service Insider, June 23, 2003, at 3.
57
 Eve Tahmincioglu, The Online Way of Death, Salon.com, Apr. 28, 2003.
58
 Casket Royale: Retail and Ordering Information, at http://www.casketroyale.com/html/necustomers.html. See also 
Mei Fong, E-Business: The Web @ Work / Casket Royale, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 2001, at B4; Louis Jacobson, 
Breakaway (A Special Report), Wall St. J., May 14, 2001, at R5. 
59
 Fong, supra note _ , at B4. 
60
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 Tahmincioglu, supra note _ (noting that “it’s unclear how prevalent online funeral planning is,” and that the 
“National Funeral Directors Association does not track how many of its 13,500 members have a Web presence”).
62 Jacobson, supra note __, at R5 (“Independent vendors sell about 50,000 of the two million caskets sold 
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63 FSI’s Third Party Seller Survey, Funeral Service Insider, April 19, 2004, at 3. 
64
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Chicago Tribune, Mar. 16, 2003, at 1.
65
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B. Casket Sale Regulations
State regulation of Internet casket sales varies widely. It appears that no state has enacted 
specific statutes or regulations for online sales. Instead, if the state regulates online sales, the 
state regulates online vendors by applying existing regulations designed for bricks-and-mortar, 
third-party vendors.67 Iowa, for example, regulates pre-need casket sales from third-party 
vendors, and applies the same regulations to Internet sales.68 Overall, only a handful of states 
have regulations that apply to online casket sales. According to a Government Accountability 
Office survey, only sixteen states regulate third-party sales of funeral goods, and only ten states 
regulate all third-party sales of funeral goods.69 In most states, therefore, funeral regulations do 
not appear to limit Internet casket sales.70
1. Explicit licensing requirements
In the approximately ten states that regulate all third-party sales, statutes restrict the sale of 
caskets in the state exclusively to licensed funeral directors.71 Typically, these states require a 
license for anyone engaged in funeral directing, and then define the practice of funeral directing 
to include the sale of funeral-related merchandise, including caskets. For example, Louisiana 
defines “funeral directing” as “the operation of a funeral home, or . . . any service whatsoever 
connected with the management of funerals, or . . . the purchase of caskets or other funeral 
rate tells the story of how American funeral service has changed”); Sylvester Brown Jr., Poker Amid Ashes? 
Cremation May Yet Get the Upper Hand, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Aug. 5, 2003, at  B1; Robert Schoenberger, 
Casket Industry Gets Creative as More Turn to Cremations, The Courier-Journal, Oct. 31, 2003, at 1F; AARP, The 
Policy Book: AARP Public Policies 2003 1 (2003).
67
 Sklar, Tr. 477; the workshop’s transcript is cited as “Tr.,” and is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/agenda.htm. 
68 Id.
69
 GAO, supra note __, at 13. Of the states that do not regulate all third-party sales, some exempt Internet sales, at-
need sales, and sales in which the consumer takes possession of the goods within a fixed period of time.
Aside from licensing, a variety of other practices have been alleged to impair e-commerce. Many independent 
vendors complain that the major manufacturers refuse to supply them, for “fear [of] being blackballed by large 
funeral home companies.” Indeed, a class action lawsuit was recently filed against Hillenbrand on this very point. 
Manufacturers say that they prefer dealing with funeral homes and maintaining their existing relationships. 
Moreover, manufacturers may have legitimate concerns about online vendors free riding on the services of local 
funeral homes, such as if an online vendor told a prospective customer to examine the selection of caskets offered at 
a funeral home’s physical show room, and then buy the casket from the online vendor. As a result of the large 
manufactures’ sales policies, some online vendors have developed relationships with independent funeral homes and 
casket distributors to obtain a supply of caskets, usually in exchange for fees or referrals.
71
 Clark Neily, Written Statement 1, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/neily.pdf; Mark 
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merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof . . . .”72 Similarly, Delaware’s statute states that 
“no person shall engage in the practice of funeral services . . . unless such person has been duly 
licensed,” and then defines “funeral services” as “those services rendered for the . . . burial, 
entombment or cremation of human remains, including the sale of those goods and services usual 
to arranging and directing funeral services.”73 On its face, therefore, Delaware’s statute appears 
to prohibit third-party casket sales.  
State licensing requirements can significantly raise the cost of entering the casket market.74
Oklahoma’s regulations require, among other things, that an individual graduate from an 
accredited program of mortuary science, complete sixty college semester hours at an accredited 
institution of higher education, pass two exams, and complete an embalmer or funeral director 
apprenticeship, “during which the applicant must embalm 25 bodies.”75 Such requirements 
consume time and money. In South Carolina, a licensee must complete an apprenticeship that 
lasts “a minimum of twenty-four months.”76 In Oklahoma, an applicant must complete at least 60 
credit hours at an accredited college or university, graduate from an accredited program of 
mortuary science, and complete a one-year apprenticeship in a funeral home during which he or 
she must embalm at least twenty-five human bodies.77 Other states require that a funeral director 
have training in embalming, a specialty that has little relation to the business of selling a casket.
In addition to requiring a funeral director’s license for selling a casket, some states also require 
that a casket seller operate out of a licensed “funeral establishment.” “Funeral establishments” 
must have particular features. Louisiana, for instance, prohibits anyone from engaging in the 
business of funeral directing “unless such business is conducted by a duly licensed funeral 
establishment.”78 An “establishment,” in turn, must have “adequate parlors or chapel,” a “display 
room,” and an “embalming room,” among other features.79 South Carolina requires that every 
funeral establishment have all of the aforementioned features, as well as “at least one motor 
hearse for transporting casketed remains.”80
Although some online vendors may also choose to operate bricks-and-mortar retail stores, an 
online vendor does not need any of these features to deliver a casket to a consumer. An Internet 
vendor need not maintain a chapel or display room because the consumer does not need to 
physically visit an online vendor at all. In addition, independent retailers never handle the body, 
and therefore do not need embalming facilities. Funeral establishment requirements, therefore,
merely add to the costs of operating online. In Powers, the district court found that, when 
combined with the facility and equipment requirements, the funeral establishment license 
72
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73
 Del. Code Ann. 24 § § 3101 (5)–(7), 3102, 3106 (a).  
74
 Harrington, supra note __, at 3.
75 Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *12; FTC Amicus Br., supra note __, at 12-13.
76
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77
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requirement “effectively precludes the in-state sale of caskets using the Internet model in which 
transactions occur by computer or by telephone.”81
It is unclear how much these regulations limit competition in practice. Some evidence suggests 
that states are not enforcing these requirements against online vendors, or at least against out-of-
state online vendors. Oklahoma’s funeral board does not regulate, investigate, or restrict the sale 
of caskets by persons or businesses located outside the state to consumers inside the state.82 The 
National Funeral Directors Association (“NFDA”) testified in 2002 that it “has no knowledge of 
any state action against an out-of-state casket retailer offering to sell caskets via the Internet. 
Therefore, online casket retailers are currently able to freely sell caskets throughout the United 
States.”83 Moreover, several online casket retailers have told the FTC staff that they ship to all 
fifty states.84 Caskets are also sold on eBay.
On the other hand, the National Casket Retailers Association, citing a Louisiana case, disagrees 
that retailers are able to sell caskets freely in all states.85 Moreover, according to a Maryland 
regulator, Washington state permits only licensed funeral service providers to sell pre-need 
caskets, which “sort of shuts out the Internet provider of caskets, pre-need or otherwise.”86
Finally, in both Oklahoma and South Carolina, recent litigation suggests that some states are 
limiting the sales of third-party vendors. In Powers v. Harris, the district court found that the 
plaintiff-casket vendors “have a reasonable and genuine fear that if they were to sell caskets to 
Oklahoma consumers, they might be prosecuted . . . . For fear of prosecution, plaintiffs have 
foregone in-state casket sales.”87
In states that apply such licensing requirements to casket sales, the requirements likely deter 
some independent vendors from selling caskets.88 Online vendors may be unwilling or unable to 
incur the costs of obtaining a license. Unlike traditional funeral homes, they may not recover the 
full financial costs of obtaining a license, because their business model involves only selling 
caskets, not providing services such as embalming.89 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “dedicating two 
years and thousands of dollars to the education and training required for licensure is undoubtedly 
a significant barrier to entering the Tennessee casket market.”90 Similarly, in Powers, the district 
court found that the state’s licensing requirements “effectively preclude” in-state online vendors 
81 Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *5. Within the last few years, G eorgia has denied the registration of a third-party 
seller of funeral goods. GAO, supra note __, at 37.
82 See Neily, Tr. 492.
83
 Neily, Tr. 462.
84
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85
 Brown, Tr. 494.
86
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90
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from obtaining a funeral director’s license and, therefore, “from selling caskets to in-state 
purchasers.”91
Finally, state licensing requirements could, in theory, prevent out-of-state online vendors from 
selling caskets to consumers within the state. In one case, Mississippi’s State Board of Funeral 
Services sent a cease and desist order to Casket Royale, a New Hampshire manufacturer, because 
neither Casket Royale nor its Mississippi-based dealers had Mississippi licenses.92 Accordingly, 
state regulations could threaten one of the Internet’s primary benefits, the ability of online 
vendors to provide goods and services to consumers across the country.
2. Indirect effects of licensing
Even if states allow unlicensed, independent vendors to sell caskets, state funeral director 
licensing could still discourage independent casket sales by reducing competition in a 
“downstream” market, the funeral directors who put the bodies into the caskets. Stringent 
licensing requirements, particularly the funeral establishment and embalming regulations, raise 
the cost of becoming a funeral director. Increased costs translate into less entry of new funeral 
directors. Over time, this reduced entry may result in fewer funeral directors or more cartel 
behavior. Online sellers, therefore, may face greater challenges in recruiting bricks-and-mortar 
funeral home partners to deliver caskets. Alternately, funeral directors, protected by higher 
barriers to entry, may feel freer to disparage online sellers.93
These indirect effects may compound the impact of explicit requirements that all casket sellers 
have funeral director’s licenses. Where casket sellers must have a license and that license is 
expensive to obtain, the licensing requirement might keep independent casket sellers out of the 
market altogether. On the other hand, where casket sellers must have a license but entry into the 
funeral directing market is easy, the licensing requirement may have little or no effect.94 Many 
of the states that require casket sellers to have funeral director’s licenses also impose costly 
licensing requirements on funeral directors, such as lengthy educational and/or apprenticeship 
requirements, and the mastery of irrelevant knowledge and skills, such as embalming bodies. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of the two types of regulation.95
A recent econometric study finds that embalming regulations impede online casket sales. 
Adjusting for population size and other demographics, an online seller’s sales are lower than 
expected in states that require that all funeral service providers must be embalmers or all funeral 
homes must have an embalming preparation room. These regulations reduce the probability of 
online casket sales in a zip code by about 25%, although the reduction is smaller in states that 
91 Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *6 .
92
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93 Harrington, supra note ___, at 11.
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allow only funeral directors to sell caskets. Since 13 of the 14 states that limit who can sell 
caskets also impose stringent embalming requirements, the most one can say is that the licensing 
requirement increases online casket sales in states that have high barriers to entry into funeral 
directing.96  This may occur because higher entry barriers lead to higher casket prices at funeral 
homes, thus increasing demand for cheaper online caskets. 
C. Applying the Tests to Funeral Regulation 
The empirical evidence undermines claims that licensing restrictions, as applied to online sales 
of caskets, serve a legitimate, non-protectionist state interest. Internet sales offer several benefits 
to consumers, including convenience and lower casket prices. The consumer protection concerns, 
in contrast, are largely illusory.
1. Licensing, E-Commerce, and Consumer Welfare
Regulations that hamper online casket sales could affect consumer welfare in several ways. They 
could affect casket prices, funeral prices, and the variety of caskets available to consumers. In 
addition, regulation could prevent consumers from enjoying the convenience of searching for 
caskets at all hours from the comfort of their homes.
a. Casket Prices
Funerals and caskets are expensive, and are becoming more so. A traditional funeral costs more 
than $5,000. A casket, typically the most expensive component of a traditional funeral,97 usually 
costs between $2,000-3,000,98 and some mahogany or metal caskets cost as much as $10,000. 
Funeral costs have risen substantially over time. From 1981 to 2001, average funeral costs 
increased from $2,086 to $5,047, a 142% increase in nominal prices. During that same time 
period general consumer prices rose only 94.8%.99
i. Economic Hypotheses
For several reasons, online purchases might lead to lower casket prices for at least some 
consumers. The simplest reason is that online shopping allows consumers to conveniently 
compare many more sellers’ prices, thus raising the odds that the online shopper will find a 
lower price than at a small number of local sellers.100 E-commerce could also lead to generally 
96 Harrington, supra note ___, at 14-15.
97 See Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
98 See note 1.
99 Average Profit Slipped to 8.08% in 2001, FFDA Reports, The American Funeral Director, June 2002; 2003 
Economic Report to the President. See also Kaiser, supra note __ (noting that from 1991 to 2000, the general 
inflation rate was 26.4%, whereas average funeral costs increased by 38.4%).
100
 A similar point has been made in the context of online wine sales. See Alan Wiseman and Jerry Ellig, Market and 
Nonmarket Barriers to Internet Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia, 6 Business and Politics (2004) at ___.
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lower retail margins and prices online by reducing the cost of searching price and nonprice 
attributes. Online casket sellers might also charge lower prices than offline sellers if state funeral 
director licensing creates market power by erecting barriers to entry and lowering the costs of 
enforcing casket cartels.101 Finally, an Internet casket retailer may simply have a fundamentally 
different business model that incurs less of the traditional retail costs, such as physical 
showrooms and sales staff. Each of these factors could lead to lower online prices.102 If bricks-
and-mortar casket sellers perceive online sales as a substantial competitive threat, they may 
respond with lower prices.
A growing body of empirical research finds that e-commerce often offers lower prices and 
sometimes reduces prices charged by bricks-and-mortar sellers as well. In auto retailing, for 
example, users pay lower prices by using a referral site (autobytel.com) that facilitates price 
competition among dealers.103 Similarly, one study found that online book and compact disk 
(CD) prices were 9-16% lower than those in bricks-and-mortar stores, even after including 
shipping costs and sales taxes.104 Another study found that wine consumers could find lower 
prices online (even including shipping costs) than in northern Virginia stores for a sample of 
popular wines retailing for more than $20 per bottle.105 By 2004, legalization of interstate direct-
to-consumer wine shipping in Virginia had reduced the online vs. bricks-and-mortar price 
difference by 40%.106 Contact lenses purchased online cost less on average than lenses purchased 
from bricks-and-mortar sellers, although warehouse clubs offer the lowest prices of all.107
Finally, web sites that facilitate price comparisons for term life insurance policies have lowered 
premiums for policies sold offline by 8-15%.108
As a matter of economic theory, however, online sales need not lead to lower prices. The 
literature on e-commerce offers two hypotheses suggesting why online prices could be higher 
than offline prices: the value of consumers’ time, and reduced search costs for quality attributes.  
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If Internet casket sellers are not the lowest-cost suppliers, they may charge a higher price and 
survive because their customers find the convenience worth the extra cost.109 Alternately, by 
reducing the cost of obtaining information on quality attributes, online sales could increase 
customers’ ability to perceive quality differences between different types of caskets, and online 
sellers could charge higher prices that reflect these perceived differences.110 In both instances, the 
higher online prices need not reduce consumer welfare, because consumers would pay the higher 
prices only if they perceived greater value.
Some empirical studies have found that online prices are higher than offline prices. Studies of 
online auto auctions, CDs, books, and software have found that prices are higher online.111 Wines 
retailing for less than $20 cost more online than in bricks-and-mortar stores, once shipping costs 
are included in the online price.112 The book and CD studies, however, occurred relatively early 
in the history of e-commerce; more recent studies suggest online prices are lower. The wine 
result is explained by shipping costs, since wine is relatively heavy and expensive to ship. 
Although economic theory suggests that online prices could be higher or lower than offline 
prices, the bulk of the evidence suggests that they are often lower.
There is, finally, one circumstance in which lower online prices might actually lead offline prices 
to be higher than they would otherwise be. When retailers face consumers with different price 
elasticities of demand, they will charge different prices in equilibrium.113  In states where online 
casket sales are legal, the market might actually be segmented into offline and online 
components. Funeral directors and other offline merchants, knowing that the majority of their 
consumers are less price sensitive than the typical online consumer, might be able to exploit this 
differential by raising prices. In this case, the net effect of online casket sales on average casket 
prices may be ambiguous. 
This proposition has been less frequently tested in the e-commerce literature. Some studies find 
that online and offline sales channels are indeed in the same market. The probability that a 
consumer will purchase a computer online, for example, increases by more than 1% for every 
1% increase in offline prices, suggesting that online prices may help keep offline prices lower 
109 Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson, supra note ___ at 109.
110 John G. Lynch and Dan Ariely, Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality, and 
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than they would otherwise be.114 Similarly, legalization of direct wine shipping from out-of-state 
businesses to Virginia consumers tended to reduce the spread between online and offline 
prices.115 No empirical studies find that online sales have increased offline prices.  
ii. Casket Prices
Anecdotal evidence suggests that online casket prices are often lower than bricks-and-mortar 
prices. Third-party casket sellers typically charge significantly lower prices than funeral homes 
for comparable caskets.116 Some independent vendors undercut established funeral home prices 
by as much as 50%.117 One court found that funeral homes mark up their casket prices from 250-
400%, and sometimes as high as 600%, whereas online vendors mark up their caskets by 
substantially less.118 In Casket Royale, the court concluded that, “as a result of this requirement, 
consumers in Mississippi are offered fewer choices when it comes to selecting a casket . . . . 
Ultimately, the consumer is harmed by this regulation as one is forced to pay higher prices in a 
far less competitive environment.”119
Similarly, surveys imply that online casket sales have helped reduce bricks-and-mortar prices. In 
a 2004 survey of funeral homes, 71% of those responding stated that they had reduced markups 
on caskets in response to third-party sellers.120 In the same survey, 41% of respondents stated that 
their average casket markup exceeded 200%, whereas two years ago, 68% of them had markups 
higher than 200%.121 In Powers, the court found that “as long as independent sellers stay in the 
market, casket sales from independent sources . . . place downward pressure on casket prices as a 
result of increased competition. This downward pressure may result, and in other states has at 
times resulted, in lower casket prices.”122 Finally, according to one economist, “Enough people 
are now browsing for caskets [on the Internet] that an owner of a brick-and-mortar funeral home 
told me that more and more people are coming to his funeral home with pictures (and prices) of 
caskets they found on the Internet.” Even if customers feel that negotiating over prices is 
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disrespectful to the deceased, “funeral directors see the prices and understand that they need to 
respond to them.”123
Two recent economic studies have examined the effects of casket sales restrictions and the 
potential for Internet casket sales to offer consumers lower prices. Yale University economists 
Judith Chevalier and Fiona Scott Morton analyzed data from surveys of funeral directors’ 
Generalized Price Lists in six southern states. They found that a state requirement that casket 
sellers must have funeral director’s license increases the price funeral homes charge for a plain, 
cloth-covered wood casket by about $261. The potential Internet savings, however, are even 
larger. Chevalier and Scott Morton’s regression analysis finds that funeral directors charge about 
$1045 for a plain wood casket in restrictive states, but similar caskets are available on the 
Internet for about $440. Even after accounting for the fact that funeral directors in non-restrictive 
states charge higher prices for their services, the consumer in a non-restrictive state could still 
save $344 on the cost of a funeral by buying the casket online.124  Funeral homes in restrictive 
states also charge about $124 more for a cardboard box for cremation.125
Chevalier and Scott Morton also used 1997 Economic Census data from 49 states to test whether 
funeral directors’ receipts per death for funeral merchandise are higher in restrictive states. They 
found that in restrictive states, funeral directors had merchandise receipts per death that were 
$175 higher than in non-restrictive states.126
Another study, conducted by an expert witness in the Powers case, compared an online vendor’s 
prices for 30 caskets with prices for the same caskets sold in 14 Oklahoma funeral homes. The 
funeral homes’ prices averaged 68% higher than those of the Internet retailer. Funeral home 
prices for the same casket varied significantly, with an average price spread of 52%.127  Thus, a 
consumer who shopped several funeral homes could achieve significant savings, but a consumer 
who shopped on the Internet could achieve even larger savings. 
More recent empirical research thus confirms the anecdotal evidence cited in court cases:
consumers can save a significant amount of money on caskets by purchasing them on the 
Internet. Moreover, competition from third-party casket sellers appears to have forced funeral 
directors in non-restrictive states to lower their casket prices, although the funeral directors’ 
prices still appear to be far above the cost of a casket. Whether these price savings on caskets 
translate into lower overall funeral costs is less clear. 
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b. Funeral Prices
Economic theory suggests that online casket sales may or may not lower overall funeral costs.128
In response to competition from independent casket vendors, funeral directors may simply raise 
prices for their other goods and services to compensate for lower casket prices, particularly if 
they have market power based on factors besides their control of casket sales.129 This is, of 
course, simply an application of the “one monopoly rent” theory associated with “Chicago 
school” antitrust analysis.130
On the other hand, third-party casket sales could help reduce overall funeral prices if the demand 
for caskets is less price elastic than the demand for other funeral goods and services. For 
example, if a funeral director could more easily persuade consumers to buy a more expensive 
casket than to spend additional money on a more elaborate service, then third party casket sales 
constrain the funeral director’s ability to price discriminate. Likewise, if consumers are less 
likely to perceive a high casket price as an excessive charge, then the funeral director has an 
incentive to take more of his profit through high casket prices.131 This strategy is less likely to 
succeed if consumers have access to caskets sold by third parties who lack market power from 
regulatory barriers to entry.
One district court found both effects: 
In some states where open price competition is occurring, the overall price of 
funerals appears to be going down or escalating at a decreased rate. In some cases, 
however, when competition increases, funeral homes have raised their prices for 
the other services they provide in order to compensate for profits lost due to lower 
casket prices.132
Similarly, at an FTC workshop on barriers to e-commerce, one panelist agreed that greater 
competition for casket sales likely would lower funeral costs somewhat: “increasing competition 
in casket markets will, however, probably reduce funeral expenditures, just not as much as some 
people think.”133 According to that panelist, competitive casket markets will constrain how much 
funeral directors can raise other prices, in part because consumers might search for better deals. 
Once consumers learn that there are options to choose from among funeral arrangements, prices 
will have to change to match the discriminating customer.134 Moreover, price competition would 
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increase due to the development of referral systems between online casket vendors and funeral 
homes.135 Some web sites already offer this type of service.
Two econometric studies have examined the effect of casket sales restrictions on total funeral 
costs, with conflicting results.
Daniel Sutter analyzed Economic Census data from 1997 to determine whether 13 states that 
required casket sellers to have funeral director’s licenses had higher funeral costs. The study 
found that the restrictions’ effect depended on the difficulty of obtaining a funeral director’s 
license. Funeral homes’ receipts per death were about $450 (11%) higher in states that required a 
funeral director’s license and imposed the most extensive training requirements.136  Thus, the 
licensing requirement raises consumers’ funeral costs when barriers to entry into funeral 
directing are high, but not when barriers to entry are low. Receipts per death for the entire death 
care industry (including cemeteries and crematories) were $132-826 (3-16%) higher in the states 
than ban third-party casket sales and impose the most extensive training requirements on funeral 
directors. This finding suggests that funeral directors benefit at the expense of both consumers 
and other death care providers, such as cemeteries and crematories.137 Casket sales restrictions 
also increase the number of funeral homes per capita and funeral home employees per death in 
states with the most stringent licensing requirements, which suggests that the restrictions tend to 
protect smaller, less efficient funeral homes.138
Chevalier and Scott Morton reached a different conclusion examining similar 1997 Economic 
Census data. They found that in restrictive states, funeral directors had higher receipts per death 
for merchandise, but this effect was roughly balanced by lower receipts per death for funeral 
directors’ services. The authors conclude that, after the FTC’s 1984 Funeral Rule made it easier 
for consumers to purchase funeral goods from third parties, “funeral directors moved rents out of 
funeral goods and into funeral services, except in states which adopt funeral good sales 
restrictions.”139 Employing 2002 Economic Census data, they found that funeral directors’ total
receipts per death were unaffected when several states removed their licensing requirement for 
casket sales in response to court challenges.140
The different findings in the Sutter and Chevalier/Scott Morton studies may be a result of 
different control variables and econometric specifications. Sutter controls for the severity of the 
states’ barriers to entry into funeral directing, finding that the licensing requirement for casket 
sellers increases receipts per death only in states that impose the most extensive training 
requirement on funeral directors. Casket sales restrictions have a disproportionate impact in 
135
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states with higher barriers to entry into funeral directing. In states with low barriers to entry, 
competition among licensed funeral directors may suffice to keep prices near costs—and 
entrepreneurs who really just want to sell caskets can easily obtain a funeral director’s license. 
Chevalier and Scott Morton do not control for the difficulty of obtaining a funeral director’s 
license, but they do control for the cremation rate and each state’s historic pattern of funeral 
spending. A definitive answer awaits future research. In the meantime, Sutter’s findings should 
give policymakers and courts reason to question state laws that require casket sellers to have 
funeral directors’ licenses. 
c. Variety
Aside from lower prices, online casket sales also offer consumers a greater variety of caskets. 
When consumer tastes are heterogeneous, increased variety makes consumers better off, 
“especially . . . when the additional customization or versioning can be produced at very low or 
zero marginal costs.”141
Consumers can purchase individualized caskets with non-standard interior linings, such as fur or 
leather, or particular themes, such as western or Victorian themes.142 They also can purchase 
caskets with humorous themes; one casket is emblazoned with the words “Return to Sender.”143
Consumers may not find such caskets through funeral homes, which may have only a certain 
number of samples available to show. Although it is difficult to quantify the benefits of product 
variety in this market, at least some consumers appear to highly value the ability to personalize 
their loved ones’ caskets. One consumer, for instance, spent several hundred dollars having his 
father’s casket painted with the colors of his father’s favorite university.144 Other consumers may 
have religious reasons for wanting a certain style of casket. Accordingly, while the extent of 
competition’s effect on price is not clear, competition certainly increases consumer choice.
d. Other Effects 
The Internet offers consumers a variety of intangible benefits. Some consumers may prefer the 
privacy of shopping for a casket online.145 Some consumers may feel less pressure from 
salespeople by shopping for a casket over the Internet.146 Finally, as in many industries, 
consumers may prefer the convenience of shopping online. For both pre-need and at-need sales, 
consumers can search the Internet twenty-four hours a day from the convenience of their 
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homes.147 Similarly, online sales could lower consumers’ “coordination costs” by allowing family 
members in different parts of the country to select a casket jointly.
In short, competition from independent, online casket sellers offers consumers significant
benefits. Licensing regulations can impair this competition directly, by keeping independent 
casket sellers out of the market, or indirectly, by creating market conditions conducive to cartels 
or exclusionary behavior by bricks-and-mortar funeral directors. Thus, licensing can create 
significant costs for consumers.
2. Assessing the Consumer Protection Rationale
Although we have limited empirical information about the impact of state licensing on 
competition in the casket market, the impact on consumer protection is more certain. There is 
little or no evidence that these requirements benefit casket purchasers rather than the funeral 
directors.148  For three reasons, state licensing of independent casket sellers is unlikely to benefit 
casket purchasers. First, many consumers are not as vulnerable or uninformed as the advocates of 
regulation assume.149 Indeed, a consumer savvy enough to try and purchase a casket from 
someone other than his or her funeral director is likely to be relatively well-informed. Second, to 
the extent that some consumers are vulnerable or uninformed, more stringent state licensing 
likely compounds the problem. Stringent licensing raises barriers to entry, reduces competition, 
and makes it easier for funeral directors to employ aggressive sales practices.150 Third, most 
licensing requirements have little relation to the business of selling caskets. Even if licensing 
funeral directors provides some consumer protection or public health benefits, licensing 
independent casket retailers provides no analogous benefits. Accordingly, the empirical evidence 
deeply undermines the argument that state licensing of casket retailers promotes a legitimate 
state interest.
a. Sales Pressure
Some states and funeral homes argue that grieving consumers need protection from aggressive 
sales tactics. They contend that consumers may lack the ability to comparison shop or resist sales 
pressure. In Powers, for instance, the district court found that “at least in some instances, 
Oklahoma funeral homes have employed sharp practices in their dealings with consumers 
purchasing caskets.”151
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The best empirical evidence, however, suggests that many consumers can and do make rational 
funeral purchasing decisions.152 Consumers often benefit from prior experience when making 
choices regarding funerals. For example, an FTC staff survey found that over 60% of 
respondents had been involved in at least one prior funeral arrangement.153 Moreover, only 11%
of respondents arranged funerals alone; many first-time consumers receive help from friends and 
relatives.154 In addition, because the majority of deaths are not unexpected or sudden, consumers 
can gather information and arrange funerals deliberately and in advance.155 Experience, 
reputation, and referrals are important ways that consumers gather information about individual 
funeral directors.156 Funeral directors’ trade associations even survey consumers to gauge their 
satisfaction with prices and relay consumer feedback to individual funeral homes.157  Moreover, 
consumers purchase many goods and services at the time of a funeral from non-funeral directors, 
such as airline tickets and flowers, with no reported problems.158
One of the most significant tests of the “ignorant consumer” hypotheses lies in a comprehensive 
assessment of the effects of the FTC’s Funeral Rule. The Funeral Rule essentially requires that 
funeral directors disclose itemized price lists and provide a final statement of goods and services.  
The Rule also requires that funeral directors refrain from various types of misrepresentations, 
from requiring the purchase of certain goods and services as a condition for receiving other 
goods and services, and from embalming for a fee without prior approval.159 The FTC enacted the 
rule to protect ignorant and harried consumers from exploitation by aggressive and 
knowledgeable funeral directors. Yet by most measures, the rule led to little change in consumer 
shopping or purchasing behavior.160 In fact, the rule appears to have increased consumer 
spending on funerals—a result difficult to square with the notion that, prior to the rule, funeral 
directors were selling consumers unwanted merchandise.161 The rule generated no increase in 
consumer satisfaction, which surveys showed already exceeded 90% prior to the rule’s 
enactment.162
Finally, the fact that some licensed funeral homes may engage in aggressive sales tactics does 
not support licensing requirements for independent casket sellers. Arguments for regulation of 
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funeral directors assume that funeral purchasers are “ignorant, beleaguered, and dissatisfied.”163
They must make unexpected and rapid decisions with little information about competitive 
alternatives. The funeral director, as a trained, informed professional, may manipulate the 
customer’s emotions to sell things that customers would not purchase when in a calmer state of 
mind, or may selectively disclose only the more expensive options, including caskets. 
Whatever the merits of these arguments, they are basically irrelevant for independent casket 
sales, and especially irrelevant for online sales. Requiring independent retailers to have funeral 
directors’ licenses will protect few grief-stricken consumers. These consumers are the ones who 
are usually assumed to deal only with the funeral director who provides the funeral services and 
thus eschew comparison shopping at independent casket retailers.164 Licensing requirements for 
independent casket retailers could, however, reduce the flow of useful information to consumers 
who do want to shop around. Independent casket sellers provide consumers with an additional 
set of competitive options and an alternative source of information. Online casket vendors allow 
consumers to search available models and compare prices without having to interact with sales 
staff at all. Regulations that increase barriers to independent casket sales tend to deprive 
consumers of this alternative information source and increase consumer vulnerability to 
manipulation.
In Powers, the Federal Trade Commission argued precisely this point in refuting a particularly 
novel consumer protection theory. Oklahoma argued that casket sellers must have funeral 
director’s licenses to ensure that casket purchasers are protected by the FTC’s Funeral Rule.165
The Funeral Rule applies only to businesses that supply both funeral goods and funeral services, 
which is precisely what funeral directors do. Former FTC officials have questioned whether the 
rule was really justified by funeral market conditions.166 Regardless of the merits of the rule, as 
the FTC itself pointed out in an amicus brief, requiring independent casket sellers to have funeral 
director’s licenses does not further the goals of the Funeral Rule:
The fundamental purpose of the Rule is to protect consumers by giving them full 
information in order to promote greater competition. In adopting the Rule, the 
Commission determined that, without adequate information, consumers could find 
themselves at the mercy of individual funeral directors, who, in turn, would be 
insulated from meaningful competition. The Rule sought to remedy that problem 
by helping to ensure that funeral directors faced genuine competition, to the 
ultimate benefit of consumers.
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The purpose and effect of the challenged portion of the FSLA [Funeral Services 
Licensing Act] is precisely the opposite. Rather than promote competition, the 
FSLA prohibits it. Rather than protect consumers by exposing funeral directors to 
meaningful competition, the FSLA protects funeral directors from facing any 
competition from third-party casket sellers. Rather than promote consumer 
choice, the FSLA forces consumers to purchase caskets from funeral directors. 
Whatever ends the FSLA can be said to be advancing, it is not advancing the ends 
of the FTC’s Funeral Rule.167
Indeed, it is likely that Oklahoma’s licensing requirement would not even have subjected 
independent casket sellers to the Funeral Rule, since the rule explicitly applies only to “funeral 
providers” who furnish both “funeral goods and funeral services.”168 Even if the Funeral Rule 
produces consumer benefits, therefore, licensing casket sellers would not produce any benefits 
due to the Funeral Rule. 
b. Grief Counseling
Some states and funeral homes have expressed concerns about the mental health of consumers 
buying caskets online. They argue that funeral directors are trained to comfort people during a 
time of loss. Mirroring arguments in other industries, funeral homes contend that “a casket is not 
just a commodity like a shirt or a pair of shoes; it is a product for a special specific event at a 
very sensitive and specific time.”169 In addition, some grief counselors believe that consumers 
should visit funeral homes to ease the grieving process,170 and others worry that online sales 
might “trivialize the gravity of death.”171 A Maryland regulator testified that the “difficulty with 
an Internet sale is that we may not have the opportunity for this give and take and personal 
exchange.”172
Online sales, however, simply give consumers a choice of where to buy a casket. Even in states 
that allow online sales, most consumers continue to purchase caskets through funeral directors. 
Furthermore, consumers can receive psychological help from people other than licensed funeral 
directors; in the Tennessee case, one of the unlicensed funeral vendors was an ordained 
minister.173 Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted two other problems with this argument:
[E]ven those who purchase from casket retailers will still need a licensed funeral 
director for arranging services and handling the body, at which time the survivors 
may still receive the benefit of the funeral director’s psychological training. 
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Moreover, survivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make funeral 
arrangements, from churches to food vendors for a wake, none of whom is 
required to have this psychological training. This justification is very weak, 
indeed.174
c. Health and Safety
Some states and funeral homes contend that licensing promotes health and safety, because proper 
disposal of human remains affects the environment and the public.175
The evidence, however, shows that caskets themselves do not protect consumers. “Caskets have 
not been shown to play a role in protecting public health, safety, or sanitation, nor have they been 
shown to aid in protection of the environment.”176 In Craigmiles, the district court found that “the 
record contains no evidence that anyone has ever been harmed by a leaky casket.”177 Many states 
do not require the use of a casket in a burial at all; in both Oklahoma and Tennessee, for 
example, consumers can provide their own casket, or none at all.178 Similarly, Georgia sets no 
standards for the design or construction of caskets.179 At the FTC workshop, no one presented 
evidence demonstrating a link between public health and caskets, or evidence that consumers 
suffered harm in states that did not require a license to sell a casket.
In any case, even if caskets did benefit the environment, a casket retailer would not need 
specialized training to sell them. “Selling a casket is not rocket science. You don’t need to be a 
funeral director, to be educated at a mortuary school to do these things.”180 None of the federal 
courts that considered the issue found that selling a casket required specialized training. The 
court in the Oklahoma case, for example, concluded that “very little specialized knowledge is 
required to sell caskets.”181 Currently, “none of the training received by licensed funeral directors 
regarding caskets has anything to do with public health or safety.”182 Less than 5% of the 
education and training requirements for a license relate to selling a casket.183
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In terms of logistics, independent casket retailers can provide caskets in a timely manner. 
Independent casket retailers face the same types of shipping and inventory issues as funerals. 
The fact that a casket comes from an independent seller “does not present any unique problems 
for funeral directors or for customers.”184 In Casket Royale, the court found that “Defendants 
have failed to show that the licensing requirement in any way speeds the process of burial. More 
importantly, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence that unlicensed dealers slow burial 
or cremation.”185
Finally, there is no difference in quality between caskets sold by independent vendors and those 
sold by funeral directors.186 For most caskets, the manufacturer, not the retailer, provides a 
warranty, which will seldom if ever address the protective qualities of the caskets.187 A casket is a 
“glorified box” that “does not differ from any other product in the marketplace.”188 In 
Craigmiles, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “there is no evidence in the record that licensed 
funeral directors were selling caskets that were systematically more protective than those sold by 
independent casket retailers. Indeed, the only difference between the caskets is that those sold by 
licensed funeral directors were systematically more expensive.”189 Of course, if there was a 
difference in casket quality, a state could simply regulate the casket directly, with far fewer 
anticompetitive effects.
d. Legal Remedies
Some funeral homes and states maintain that consumers could suffer from fraud or other abuses 
if they buy caskets from independent sources. They suggest that injured consumers would have 
no legal remedy unless casket sales are limited to funeral directors subject to regulatory 
oversight.
Like any retailers, however, casket sellers are subject to the same general consumer protection 
laws as any other business, including state contract and consumer protection laws.190 Many of 
these laws provide for private rights of action.191 At the FTC’s workshop, for example, no one 
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presented evidence indicating that these laws do not provide sufficient remedies for consumers, 
or that jurisdictional concerns present any greater difficulties in this market than in any other.192
3. Less Restrictive Alternatives
To the extent that states seek to protect consumers, they may have less restrictive means than 
licensing of achieving their consumer protection goals. In the first place, states could best protect 
consumers by encouraging competition. As Craigmiles found, competition, not regulation, 
represents the best remedy for practices that raise consumer protection concerns: “perhaps the 
best antidote for the evil of funeral goods and services bundling by funeral homes is to have 
third-party competitors on individual items like caskets.”193 Online sales allow consumers to 
comparison shop among a much larger number of casket providers. Through the Internet, 
consumers can avoid having to interact with salespeople in purchasing a casket altogether, and 
the empirical evidence indicates that online sales put competitive pressure on funeral homes. By 
easing licensing requirements, states would encourage competition and, therefore, increase 
consumer protection.
Greater competition also would improve the overall quality of caskets purchased by consumers. 
By lowering prices, competition would allow consumers to purchase better caskets. The Sixth 
Circuit explained the effect concisely: 
In fact, restricting sales of caskets to licensed funeral directors would seem to 
have an adverse effect on the quality of caskets. The licensing requirement does 
not require consumers to choose more protective caskets or funeral directors to 
recommend them. Generally, however, the cost of more protective caskets is 
higher. If casket retailers were to increase competition on casket prices and bring 
those prices closer to marginal costs, then more protective caskets would become 
more affordable for consumers with limited funds and their use would likely 
increase.194
The FTC staff offered a similar analysis in the contact lens industry. Staff testimony before the 
Connecticut Board of Examiners for Opticians noted that higher prices for disposable contact 
lenses likely lead consumers to replace them less frequently than their doctors recommend.195
192
 Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission has authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to bring an enforcement 
action against a casket seller who makes false or misleading claims about the products or services it provides. 15 
U.S.C. § 45. The Commission also has authority under its unfairness jurisdiction to stop marketing practices that 
cause or are likely to cause substantial consumer injury, which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers and is not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). See also Unfairness 
Policy Statement, appended to International Harvester Co., 104 FTC 949, 1070 (1984). Many state attorneys 
general have similar authority.
193 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228.
194 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226.
195 See FTC Staff Comment Before the Connecticut Board of Examiners for Opticians (Mar. 27, 2002), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020007.htm.
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In terms of regulation, states can tailor laws to address a specific consumer protection concern. 
For example, Mississippi justified its licensing regime as a way to prevent funeral directors from 
soliciting dead bodies,196 but Mississippi could have simply applied its solicitation rule to all 
casket vendors. Likewise, if a state found, hypothetically, that the evidence demonstrated a 
concern about the quality of caskets, states could simply establish standards for casket usage and 
quality rather than limit the types of vendors who could sell caskets.197
Finally, if states choose to require a license to sell a casket, they can lower the cost of obtaining 
one, or require simple registration. For example, states need not require training in embalming, 
which has no relation to the business of selling a casket. Some states impose relatively simple 
requirements to obtaining a license. California requires only that a licensee pass a test, but does 
not impose specific educational or apprenticeship standards.198 According to a Maryland 
regulator, Maryland’s licensing system is “more of a registration. There’s no training or 
education requirements, and the permit applications for businesses are rarely unmet . . . Our 
barrier is that they have to be in business and above 21 in age and not be on parole, and they’re 
in. So, that doesn’t keep too many people out.”199 Maryland also gives out-of-state internet 
vendors the option to voluntarily submit to the state’s jurisdiction, which some vendors accept to 
instill confidence in potential customers.200
IV. Conclusion
Both the case law and the empirical evidence undermine the argument that state funeral 
licensing, as applied to online casket sales, furthers a legitimate state interest. Powers
notwithstanding, naked protectionism is not a legitimate state interest. No other court has so 
held. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that the regulations likely harm consumers by 
raising casket prices and restricting the variety of available caskets.
In light of Granholm and the casket cases, courts may increasingly scrutinize regulations that 
impair the flow of e-commerce, not only in caskets and wine, but in many other industries 
ranging from automobiles to real estate. The Granholm court extensively analyzed the effects of 
discriminatory regulation on interstate commerce, consumer welfare, and the underlying 
196 Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
197 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226, 228 (“The legislature could develop similar standards for casket retailers, or even 
make Section 317 directly applicable to casket retailers also, without requiring the licensure that is the subject of 
complaint . . . The licensure requirement imposes a significant barrier to competition in the casket market. By 
protecting licensed funeral directors from competition on caskets, the FDEA harms consumers in their pocketbooks. 
If consumer protection were the aim of the 1972 amendment, the General Assembly had several direct means of 
achieving that end”).
198
 Harrington and Krynski, supra note ___, at 205. See also GAO, Funeral-Related Industries 22 (1999) (analyzing 
five states’ approach to regulation). 
199
 Sklar, Tr. 479, 503.
200 Id. at 479-80.
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consumer protection rationales. When state regulation clearly impedes e-commerce—even 
ostensibly intrastate commerce—courts may well find that the regulation also impedes interstate 
commerce. If so, they would then need to use empirical evidence to evaluate the state’s 
justifications.
The empirical evidence shows that licensing third party casket retailers increases casket prices, 
may increase overall funeral expenditures (when barrier to entry into funeral directing are high), 
and likely deprives consumers of the increased variety and convenience that online casket sales 
offer. In addition, there is little evidence that licensing is necessary to accomplish any legitimate 
public purpose. Many funeral purchasers are well-informed consumers who are unlikely to need 
the protections that licensing purports to offer. Licensing third-party casket sellers offers 
consumers little additional protection, since most of the consumers likely to shop from third 
party vendors are likely to be well-informed. Discouraging market entry by online casket sellers 
could actually reduce consumer protections by depriving consumers of useful information they 
can garner from online sellers. Online casket sales do not deprive consumers of access to grief 
counseling, since casket buyers must still deal with trained funeral directors and often other 
professionals, such as clergy, to obtain funeral services. Licensing of casket retailers does 
nothing to improve public health or safety. Finally, states can use less restrictive alternatives, 
such as registration, to accomplish the legitimate public purposes that licensing is purported to 
accomplish.
For these reasons, state funeral regulations which impede electronic commerce in caskets would 
almost certainly fail a Granholm-style factual analysis. This implies that such regulations could 
be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.  They would also likely fail a challenge 
under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause if courts consider whether evidence actually 
supports the state’s defense. Accordingly, Granholm may ultimately drive the last nail into the 
coffin of casket sales licensing.
